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BIEDIGER v. QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY
 University1 athletic departments across the country are often faced with difficult 
budgetary decisions affecting the number and types of sports teams they support. 
Universities are sometimes forced to defund certain programs to resolve budgetary 
issues, but the decision to cut a team involves not only financial considerations, but 
legal considerations as well. Football and men’s basketball are the only two National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) sports that have been reported profitable by 
any university.2 However, universities cannot simply choose to maintain only profit-
generating programs because Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 requires 
universities to create and maintain equal athletic opportunities for men and women.3
 In determining whether a university complies with the Title IX equal opportunity 
requirement, courts apply one of three tests.4 The most commonly used test is the 
“substantial proportionality test,”5 which asks “whether intercollegiate level participation 
opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers substantially 
1. “University” includes all postsecondary institutions in this context.
2. See Christopher Lee, College Athletics by the Numbers, Sportsologist (Sept. 29, 2010), http://
sportsologist.com/college-athletics-by-the-number/ (citing NCAA, Revenues and Expenses: NCAA 
Division I Intercollegiate Athletics Programs Report 2004–2009, at 28 (Aug. 2010), available 
at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/REV_EXP_2010.pdf (stating that about 57% 
of football and men’s basketball programs are profitable)).
3. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2012) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or 
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2013) (“A recipient which 
operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic 
opportunity for members of both sexes.”); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 89 (D. Conn. 
2010) (using the word “genuine” to refer to the 1996 letter from Norma V. Cantú, the former Assistant 
Secretary for Civil Rights at the Department of Education, which explained that for an athlete to be 
counted toward Title IX, he or she must be given opportunity that is “real, not illusory” (Norma Cantú, 
Clarification of Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: A Three-Part Test, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Jan. 16, 
1996), available at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html)). 
4. See A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979) 
(“(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in 
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments; or (2) Where the members of one sex 
have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a 
history and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing 
interest and abilities of the members of that sex; or (3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented 
among intercollegiate athletes and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program expansion 
such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities of the members of 
that sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the present program.”).
5. See Ephraim Glatt, Defining “Sport” Under Title IX: Cheerleading, Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, and 
the Proper Scope of Agency Deference, 19 Sports Law. J. 297, 303 (2012) (explaining that the substantial 
proportionality test provides a safe harbor for universities that do not want to engage in extensive 
compliance analysis because the university can maintain compliance by maintaining gender parity 
between its student body and its athletic population (citing Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 
F.3d 265, 275 (1994)); Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 94 (2d Cir. 2012) (“OCR has not 
construed substantial proportionality to require exact proportionality. Rather, substantial proportionality 
is determined on a case-by-case basis in light of ‘the institution’s specific circumstances and the size of 
its athletic program.’” (quoting Cantú, supra note 3)); Ashlee A. Cassman, Bring It On! Cheerleading vs. 
Title IX: Could Cheerleading Ever Be Considered an Athletic Opportunity?, 17 Sports Law. J. 245, 257 
(2010) (“Athletic directors are often advised that satisfying [the substantial proportionality test] is the 
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proportionate to their respective enrollments.”6 The substantial proportionality test 
consists of two prongs. Under the first prong, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) or a 
court must determine the number of athletic opportunities the university provides. 
Under the second prong, the university must establish that the number of athletic 
opportunities provided is substantially proportionate to the number of students enrolled 
at the university for each respective sex.7 There are two ways to calculate the number of 
athletic opportunities under prong one. The first way, hereinafter “part A,” is whether 
an activity is a recognized sport.8 If an activity does not satisfy part A, it may be 
evaluated under “part B,” which determines whether the activity is a genuine athletic 
opportunity under the OCR definition.9
 Under part A, an activity is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that it is a sport 
if it is recognized by an intercollegiate athletic organization, such as the NCAA or the 
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics (NAIA).10 If it is not recognized by 
an intercollegiate athletic organization, the court will evaluate the activity under part 
B and determine if it is a “genuine athletic opportunity” for Title IX compliance 
purposes on a case-by-case basis by considering factors such as administration, 
structure, preparation, and competition.11 Specifically, only genuine athletic 
opportunities taking place in the context of a sport can be counted toward compliance.12 
Once it has been established that a genuine athletic opportunity exists, the court will 
compare the number of opportunities provided to each sex with the university’s 
respective enrollment.13 Only those universities that provide a number of opportunities 
that is substantially proportionate to enrollment will be in compliance with Title IX.
 Universities planning to cut funding for an unprofitable team must ensure that 
substantial proportionality is maintained either by replacing that team with another 
team for the same sex (which may be less expensive to operate) or by cutting a team 
only definite way to guarantee Title IX compliance. This is because it is the only objective and clearly 
quantifiable test.”).
6. A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413.
7. See Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 87.
8. Id. at 89.
9. Id. at 90. 
10. See id. at 89–90. 
11. See id.
12. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Stephanie Monroe, Dear Colleague 
Letter: Athletic Activities Counted for Title IX Compliance, U.S. Dep’t of Educ. (Sept. 17, 2008), available 
at http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/colleague-20080917.html (clarifying the 1996 
OCR letter, Cantú, supra note 3, stating that an athlete must be given a real, not illusory participation 
opportunity)). While the OCR does not have a specific definition for the term “sport,” it will look at 
factors such as administration, structure, preparation, and competition to determine whether an activity 
is a sport for compliance purposes. See id. Real opportunities are those that provide “the same benefits 
as would be provided to bona fide athletes.” Id. See also Glatt, supra note 5 (explaining that a given 
activity that is not comparable to existing varsity sports will not be considered a sport for Title IX 
purposes (citing Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 275 (6th Cir. 1994))). 
13. See Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 89.
460
BIEDIGER v. QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY
of the opposite sex.14 The goal of promoting gender equality through the substantial 
proportionality test can sometimes lead schools to take steps that undermine the 
purpose of Title IX, rather than promote growth of athletic opportunity. For 
example, to remain in compliance, universities sometimes engage in deceitful 
practices,15 cut teams for one sex instead of add teams for the other sex,16 or fund 
teams in which there is a lack of genuine interest to compete at the varsity level 
because those teams are less expensive to fund than more popular sports.17
 In Biediger v. Quinnipiac University, members of the varsity volleyball team 
sought an injunction to prevent the university’s athletic department from cutting 
women’s volleyball and replacing it with competitive cheerleading.18 The plaintiffs 
asserted that the university engaged in discriminatory conduct against its female 
athletes19 by replacing volleyball with an activity that is neither an NCAA varsity 
sport nor a genuine athletic opportunity.20 Using the substantial proportionality test, 
the court determined that Quinnipiac’s competitive cheerleading team was not 
presumed to be a sport because the NCAA did not recognize the activity as a sport.21 
Therefore, the court evaluated the cheerleading team according to its structure, 
administration, team preparation, and competition, and determined that Quinnipiac’s 
competitive cheerleading team did not constitute a genuine athletic opportunity for 
14. See Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1048–49 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. 
State Univs., 198 F.3d 763 (9th Cir. 1999)) (“[E]very court, in construing the Policy Interpretation and 
the text of Title IX, has held that a university may bring itself into Title IX compliance by increasing 
athletic opportunities for the underrepresented gender (women in this case) or by decreasing athletic 
opportunities for the overrepresented gender (men in this case).”).
15. See, e.g., Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 66 (finding that Quinnipiac manipulated rosters by adding female 
athletes just prior to the first competition and then removing them later in the season); see also Jay 
Larson, Note, All Sports Are Not Created Equal: College Football and a Proposal to Amend the Title IX 
Proportionality Prong, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1598, 1612 (2004) (discussing the negative implications of 
roster management practices).
16. See, e.g., Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 302 F.3d 608, 611 (6th Cir. 2002) (addressing a 
case in which, due to a lack of funds to increase athletic opportunities for women, Miami University was 
forced to cut men’s wrestling, tennis, and soccer in order to comply with Title IX’s substantial 
proportionality requirement).
17. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 258 (discussing a few of the options schools have in order to remain in 
Title IX compliance).
18. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2012); Cassman, supra note 5, at 254 
(explaining that competitive cheerleading exists for the purpose of competition, in contrast to traditional 
cheerleading, in which cheerleaders are on the sidelines cheering for a team to win, and that competitive 
cheerleading teams perform high-risk stunts resembling gymnastics and compete against other teams at 
multiple competitions throughout a season).
19. The plaintiffs also argued that Quinnipiac engaged in roster manipulation practices. This case comment 
does not address roster manipulation practices. For the court’s discussion of this claim, see Biediger, 728 
F. Supp. 2d at 65–66.
20. See Biediger, 691 F.3d at 91.
21. See id. at 103; see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993); Monroe, supra note 12; 
see generally 34 C.F.R. § 106.41 (2013).
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Title IX purposes.22 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed, 
finding Quinnipiac in violation of Title IX.23
 This case comment contends that the substantial proportionality test used to 
determine whether an extracurricular activity constitutes a genuine athletic opportunity 
is flawed because it fails to promote athletic growth through new activities and can, in 
fact, hinder the progression of intercollegiate sports. Specifically, the criteria used to 
evaluate an activity24 is flawed for two reasons.25 First, the test does not evaluate the 
athleticism required by an activity in determining whether it is a genuine athletic 
opportunity—ignoring the nature of the opportunities that the statute was intended to 
promote, and potentially encompassing sedentary activities such as chess.26 “OCR does 
not have a specific definition for the term ‘sport.’ Instead, OCR considers several 
factors related to an activity’s structure, administration, team preparation and 
competition . . . .”27 Second, evaluating whether a newly developed activity has similar 
competitive opportunities to existing sports undermines the goal of creating equal 
opportunity because teams engaging in new activities cannot survive this rigorous 
standard.28 Under a modified standard that includes consideration of the athletic 
component of an activity and allows for a developmental period, universities would 
need to cut fewer programs to maintain substantial proportionality. Thus, they would 
be better able to provide more athletic opportunities for both sexes—in support of the 
purpose of Title IX. Quinnipiac’s competitive cheerleading team would qualify as a 
genuine athletic opportunity under this modified standard.
 Quinnipiac University, a participating NCAA Division I institution located in 
Hamden, Connecticut, sponsored seven varsity men’s athletic teams and twelve 
varsity women’s athletic teams before the 2009–10 academic year.29 Academic 
enrollment at Quinnipiac totaled 5,686 students, 61.87% of whom were female and 
38.13% of whom were male.30 In March 2009, the university announced its plans to 
cut three varsity sports from its athletic program for the 2009–10 academic year—
women’s volleyball, men’s track and field, and men’s golf.31 The eliminated sports 
22. See Biediger, 691 F.3d at 93–94; Monroe, supra note 12 (describing the substantial proportionality test 
the OCR created to determine whether an activity is a sport and the factors considered in the evaluation 
of an activity); see also Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d at 896; Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 110 (1st Cir. 2011).
23. See Biediger, 691 F.3d at 104–05.
24. See Monroe, supra note 12.
25. This case comment focuses specifically on the OCR determination of a sport in the first prong of the 
substantial proportionality test. The court in Biediger focused primarily on this prong because competitive 
cheerleading is not an NCAA sport, and therefore, not entitled to the presumption that it is a sport.
26. See Glatt, supra note 5, at 321.
27. Monroe, supra note 12.
28. See id.
29. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Conn. 2010).
30. Id.
31. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2012).
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were replaced by a newly created women’s varsity competitive cheerleading squad 
with thirty spots for female participants.32
 Competitive cheerleading and varsity sports at Quinnipiac have similar 
administrative structures. The competitive cheerleading team was directed by 
Quinnipiac’s athletic department and received funding, a coaching staff, and other 
benefits akin to those of other varsity sports on campus.33 For its inaugural year, the 
cheerleading team’s operating budget began at $50,000 and increased with the 
permission of the athletic department as the year progressed.34 The coaching staff 
reported to the athletic director and was responsible for using this budget to travel, 
provide equipment, train players, and recruit athletes.35 The team also received six 
full-time scholarships to award to team members.36 Other benefits included team 
awards, university-wide awards, medical treatment, and study halls.37
 In addition to the administrative structure, the competitive cheerleading athletes 
practiced on campus a total of twenty hours during the regular season and eight 
hours during the off-season, which was consistent with NCAA practice requirements 
and other varsity sports at Quinnipiac.38 The competitive cheerleading team’s regular 
season was governed by the National Competitive Stunt and Tumbling Association 
(NCSTA), which establishes uniform rules for participating teams.39 For example, 
the NCSTA provides that teams compete in a minimum of eight competitions 
during the regular season.40 In 2009–10, Quinnipiac’s team competed in ten 
competitions with other collegiate varsity programs, collegiate club programs, 
collegiate sideline cheer teams, all-star squads, and high school cheer squads.41 
Postseason competitions were governed by the National Cheerleading Association 
(NCA), which has hosted an annual national championship for intercollegiate 
cheerleaders since 1990.42 While the NCA playoff system included several sideline 
cheer teams, the NCA placed teams in divisions according to their size and ability.43 
Quinnipiac’s cheerleading team competed only against collegiate varsity teams in the 
32. See id.
33. See id. at 103.
34. See Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 95.
35. See id. (explaining that recruiting took place solely on campus because the team was created not long 
before the season was scheduled to start).
36. See id.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 96.
39. See id. at 82.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 97.
42. See id. at 79, 97.
43. See id. at 79.
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NCA championship, demonstrating the competitive nature of the team, and 
supporting the notion that the team should be treated like other varsity sports.44
 Not all of the university’s female athletes were content with Quinnipiac’s efforts 
to comply with Title IX and provide genuine athletic opportunities for women by 
creating a competitive cheerleading program.45 Five members of the varsity volleyball 
team and their coach filed suit against the university, claiming that Quinnipiac 
discriminated against its female athletes because the athletic opportunities provided 
did not fully and effectively accommodate women’s athletic interests and abilities.46 
Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that cheerleading was not an acceptable 
replacement for the volleyball team because cheerleading is neither a varsity sport 
recognized by the NCAA, nor a genuine athletic opportunity for Title IX purposes.47
 The district court granted a permanent injunction enjoining Quinnipiac from 
cutting the volleyball program, finding that cheerleading “did not yet afford genuine 
athletic participation opportunities in a varsity sport.”48 Although the competitive 
cheerleading team was structured like other varsity sports at Quinnipiac with respect 
to administration, support services, and practice time, the court concluded that the 
cheerleading team’s inability to recruit off-campus and the underdeveloped state of 
competition49 rendered cheerleading ineligible for Title IX compliance.50
 On appeal, Quinnipiac argued that the thirty roster spots available to women on 
the competitive cheerleading team should count for Title IX purposes and that, even 
if these positions were excluded, the resulting 3.62% disparity between the percentage 
of all genuine athletic opportunities available at the university for female students 
(58.25%) and the percentage of the total student population that was female (61.87%) 
was insufficient to warrant a Title IX violation.51 Quinnipiac argued that it provided 
athletic opportunities that were “substantially proportionate” to the enrollment of 
male and female students.52 The Second Circuit rejected this argument and affirmed 
the trial court’s decision to preclude the thirty roster spots on the competitive 
44. See id. at 98.
45. See id. at 62.
46. See id. at 63–64.
47. See id. at 64 (describing the plaintiffs’ additional claims that the athletic department would manipulate 
rosters by increasing or decreasing roster sizes for the first competition in order to comply with Title 
IX’s substantial proportionality requirements, and then subsequently increasing or decreasing the 
number of roster spots).
48. Id. at 95 (granting a preliminary injunction based on the plaintiffs’ roster manipulation claims).
49. The court described the competition as “underdeveloped” because there were few varsity teams to 
compete against and no uniform rules of competition. See id. at 97–100.
50. See id. at 99–100; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897 (1st Cir. 1993); A Policy Interpretation: 
Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg.  71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979); Monroe, supra note 12; 
Equity in Athletics, Inc. v. Dep’t of Educ., 639 F.3d 91, 96 (4th Cir. 2011).
51. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 91 (2d Cir. 2012); Equity in Athletics, 639 F.3d at 110.
52. Biediger, 691 F.3d at 96.
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cheerleading team from being included in the female athlete count.53 The court 
reasoned that competitive cheerleading is not presumed to be a sport under prong one, 
part A of the substantial proportionality test because competitive cheerleading is not 
yet recognized as a varsity sport—or even as an emerging sport54—by the NCAA.55 
Competitive cheerleading also did not satisfy the OCR’s definition of a sport under 
prong one, part B despite being structured and administered like other varsity sports 
at Quinnipiac because the program did not conduct off-campus recruitment and did 
not have a uniform set of rules to govern competition.56
 This case comment contends that the substantial proportionality test the court 
used in Biediger is f lawed because it does not further the purpose of Title IX and 
hinders opportunities for growth in intercollegiate athletics.57 Specifically, the OCR 
evaluation of an activity under prong one, part B—determining if the activity 
constitutes a genuine athletic opportunity based on its structure, administration, team 
preparation, and competition—is flawed for two reasons. First, it ignores the requisite 
skill, strength, and athleticism required of a sport, despite Title IX’s purpose of 
ensuring that activities of an athletic nature are available to both genders.58 “Athleticism 
is an integral part of the definition of sport”;59 however, if the standard remains 
unchanged, activities requiring little or no physical exertion will fulfill Title IX 
53. See id. at 85.
54. Current emerging sports for women are rugby, sand volleyball, and equestrian. Emerging Sports for 
Women, NCAA (July 16, 2012), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/
Emerging+Sports+for+Women (“An emerging sport is a sport recognized by the NCAA that is intended 
to provide additional athletics opportunities to female student-athletes.”).
Bylaws require that emerging sports must gain championship status (minimum 40 
varsity NCAA programs or 28 [D]ivision III varsity programs for a [D]ivision III only 
championship) within 10 years or show steady progress toward that goal to remain on 
the list. Institutions are allowed to use emerging sports to help meet the membership 
minimum sports sponsorship requirements and, in Divisions I and II, minimum 
financial aid requirements. Sports do not have to be NCAA championship or emerging 
sports to be varsity, nor does such status mean the institution’s conduct of the sport 
meets Office for Civil Rights or Title IX standards for varsity sports.
 Id.
55. See id.; see also Biediger, 691 F.3d at 94; Monroe, supra note 12; see generally A Policy Interpretation: Title 
IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413.
56. See Biediger, 691 F.3d at 99–100; Monroe, supra note 12.
57. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 257–58. The overall intent of Title IX is to preserve the integrity of 
intercollegiate athletics by maintaining both genders’ opportunities to participate. See 34 C.F.R. § 
106.41(a) (2013) (“No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, be treated differently from another person or otherwise be discriminated against in any 
interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and no recipient shall 
provide any such athletics separately on such basis.”).
58. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c).
59. Glatt, supra note 5, at 320 (defining sport as “an athletic activity requiring skill or physical prowess” and 
as “an activity involving physical exertion and skill”).
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requirements,60 while those activities that require just as much, if not more, physical 
exertion than current varsity sports (e.g., competitive cheerleading) will not fulfill 
Title IX requirements. Second, newly proposed activities cannot offer competition 
comparable to existing varsity sports without adequate time for other universities to 
invest resources and create their own teams. University athletic departments often 
face budgetary issues and are hesitant to invest in activities that cannot help the 
university comply with Title IX.61 Requiring newly developed activities to involve 
competition that is comparable in quantity and quality to established varsity sports 
discourages universities from committing their resources to new athletic proposals.
 The evaluation process for activities under the substantial proportionality test 
should therefore be modified. First, the analysis of whether something is a genuine 
althetic opportunity should involve consideration of the athletic nature of the activity. 
Second, the test should allow a developmental period to provide for the expansion of 
competition to a level comparable to other sports. New activities that satisfy 
administrative and structural factors, such as competitive cheerleading, should be 
afforded a genuine chance to develop into a widely recognized varsity sport.
 The U.S. Department of Education (DOE) interprets Title IX to require 
universities to provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.62 
Whether a university is providing equal athletic opportunities is evaluated using one 
of three possible tests,63 but the substantial proportionality test, determining whether 
intercollegiate athletic opportunities are provided for both male and female athletes 
in numbers substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments in the 
university,64 is most commonly used.65 The substantial proportionality test consists of 
two prongs. Under prong one, part A, an activity recognized by an intercollegiate 
athletic organization—like the NCAA—is entitled to a rebuttable presumption that 
the activity is a sport and therefore a genuine athletic opportunity to be counted 
toward Title IX compliance.66 This presumption can be overcome by evidence that 
demonstrates that the activity does not satisfy the factors set forth by the OCR.67 If 
the activity is not recognized by an intercollegiate athletic organization, this 
60. See id. at 321 (using chess and card games as examples of activities that require almost no physical exertion, 
but may qualify as a “sports” or “athletic opportunities” under the current standard); Championship Central, 
NCAA, http://www.ncaa.com/championships (2013) (showing that rif le is an NCAA sport).
61. See Glatt, supra note 5, at 320.
62. Cantú, supra note 3.
63. The OCR has clarified that institutions need to comply with only one part of the three-part test—(1) 
substantial proportionality, (2) history, or (3) continuing practice or fully and effectively accommodating 
interests and abilities of the underrepresented sex. See A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and 
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979); Cantú, supra note 3.
64. See A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418; Cantú, supra 
note 3; Monroe, supra note 12.
65. See Glatt, supra note 5.
66. See Monroe, supra note 12.
67. See id. (discussing program structure, administration, team preparation, and competition).
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presumption does not apply and the court will then evaluate the activity under the 
OCR definition of a sport in prong one, part B. The factors that a court considers 
relate to program structure, administration, team preparation, and competition—
including, for example, scholarships, funding, recruiting, scheduling, practice 
schedule, and postseason play.68 If the court determines that the new activity is 
similar to existing varsity sports at the university, then it may be counted as a genuine 
athletic opportunity for Title IX purposes.69
 Under the substantial proportionality test, analysis begins under prong one by 
determining the number of all male and female participants in the institution’s 
genuine athletic opportunities.70 Under part A, if an activity is recognized by an 
intercollegiate athletic association, it may be counted toward compliance.71 If the 
activity is not recognized, it is evaluated under part B to determine whether it can be 
considered a genuine athletic opportunity.72 Athletes who receive benefits and 
services afforded to members of an intercollegiate athletic team should be counted 
toward compliance.73 These benefits include “training and practice time, coaching, 
tutoring services, locker room facilities, and equipment, as well as important non-
tangible benefits derived from being a member of an intercollegiate athletic team.”74 
Athletes who practice but may not compete are also counted because there are no 
minimum criteria for playing time or athletic ability, so long as the participant is on 
the roster by the date of the first competition.75 Once the number of genuine athletic 
opportunities is counted for both men and women, the analysis proceeds to prong 
two and the statistics must be compared with each gender’s respective enrollment at 
the university to determine if the athletic opportunities offered are substantially 
proportionate to enrollment.76 If the court finds that the numbers are substantially 
proportionate, the university is in compliance with Title IX.77
 The OCR has explained that a genuine athletic opportunity must take place in 
the context of a “sport.”78 The dictionary defines “sport” as “an activity involving 
68. See id.; Glatt, supra note 5, at 307.
69. See Monroe, supra note 12.
70. See Cantú, supra note 3.
71. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 93–94 (D. Conn. 2010).
72. See id.
73. See id. at 88–89.
74. Id. at 88.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 89; Carolyn Davis, Note, Leave It on the Field, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 265, 272 (2010) (“[S]chools 
are entitled to a presumption that they are in compliance with Title IX if they can show ‘substantial 
proportionality’ between their male and female athletic participation opportunities and overall 
enrollment.”).
77. See A Policy Interpretation: Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979); 
Cantú, supra note 3; Monroe, supra note 12.
78. Monroe, supra note 12; see also Chalenor v. Univ. of N.D., 291 F.3d 1042, 1046 (8th Cir. 2002) 
(“Assuming Chevron deference is not due, it is still true that interpretations contained in formats such as 
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physical exertion and skill in which an individual or team competes against another or 
others.”79 But prong one (including parts A and B) of the substantial proportionality 
test under Title IX does not evaluate an activity’s physical exertion, skill, or any other 
athletic component. Failing to address whether a given activity requires any physical 
exertion or skill ignores the meaning of the phrase “genuine athletic opportunity.”80
 Although the OCR has not specifically defined “sport,”81 the organization strives 
to provide opportunities similar to those sports that have already received recognition 
by intercollegiate associations, such as the NCAA, yet disregards the athletic nature 
of these prospective activities in the evaluation process. All sports recognized by the 
NCAA should require some form of inherent athleticism.82 In fact, part of the 
NCAA’s function is to research the causes of injuries sustained during athletic 
competition and establish safety guidelines to prevent those injuries,83 which suggests 
that physical exertion is an integral part of providing a genuine athletic opportunity.84 
The importance of physical exertion in qualifying an activity as a sport is also 
demonstrated by the benefits and services recognized sports receive.85 NCAA Rule 
16.4.1 provides that a school may offer medical insurance, surgical expenses, 
medication, rehabilitation, physical therapy expenses, and dental insurance to each 
participating NCAA athlete, which suggests that the sports pose a risk of physical 
injury due to the physical exertion involved.86 Furthermore, the NCAA, the leading 
governing body for intercollegiate athletics, requires “physical exertion to be with the 
opinion letters are entitled to respect . . . . Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 117 S.Ct. 905, 137 L.Ed.2d 79 
(1997)[] requires that we give deference to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations, if the 
regulations are ambiguous.  . . . If the regulation is ambiguous, then we defer to any reasonable 
construction by the Department of Education, even though its interpretation might not be the best or 
most natural one by grammatical or other standards.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
79. Sport Definition, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/sport (last visited Nov. 15, 
2012).
80. See John F. Manning & John C. Stephenson, Legislation and Regulation: Cases and 
Materials 215–16 (West Academic Publ’g 2d ed. 2013) (explaining that a statute is to be interpreted 
using the ordinary meaning of its language unless it explicitly defines some of its terms differently).
81. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 247–48.
82. See Emerging Sports for Women, supra note 54 (“The NCAA bylaws require that emerging sports must 
gain championship status (minimum 40 varsity NCAA programs or 28 [D]ivision III varsity programs 
for a [D]ivision III only championship) within 10 years or show steady progress toward that goal to 
remain on the list.”).
83. See NCAA Sport Science Institute, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/ncaa-sport-science-
institute (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
84. See NCAA Academic & Membership Aff. Staff, 2012–13 NCAA Division I Manual 1 (2012), 
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/D113.pdf. Rule 1.2(a) states that the 
NCAA’s stated purpose is to “initiate, stimulate and improve intercollegiate athletics programs for 
student-athletes and to promote and develop . . . physical fitness, athletics excellence and athletics 
participation . . . . ” Id.
85. See id. at 223.
86. See id. at 227.
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purpose of competition.”87 The current standard should be modified to address the 
physical exertion of a given activity, and the fact that it is an integral part of athletic 
competition, in order to fulfill the purpose of Title IX’s enactment.
 The omission of an athletic factor in the assessment of activities for Title IX 
compliance also undermines the overall purpose of the statute. The purpose of Title 
IX is to provide equal athletic opportunities for members of both sexes.88 Using the 
current standard, it is unclear that athletic skill is required to classify an activity as a 
sport because “any activity that meets the ‘structure and administration’ factors, as 
well as the ‘preparation and competition’ factors, is a sport, regardless of the 
athleticism involved in its performance.”89 The standard for evaluating new athletic 
opportunities should therefore be modified to include an athletic component.
 Competitive cheerleading demands tremendous amounts of energy from 
participants, similar to other Title IX qualifying sports. For example, stunts and tricks 
found in competitive cheerleading are similar to those of the Title IX-approved sport of 
gymnastics.90 Even the court in Biediger conceded that competitive cheerleading “is a 
difficult, physical task that requires strength, agility, and grace.”91 Cheerleading accounts 
for the most serious injuries to female athletes in sports,92 which arguably reflects the 
high level of difficulty and athleticism required to execute stunts incorporated in the 
activity.93 Furthermore, safety organizations were formed to develop rules to protect the 
welfare of competitive cheerleading participants and guide university programs in the 
87. Glatt, supra note 5, at 321.
88. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2013) (“A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate, 
club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity for members of both sexes.”).
89. See Glatt, supra note 5, at 321.
90. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 78 (D. Conn. 2010) (“[C]ompetitive cheer teams 
strictly engage in sport . . . and emphasize the more gymnastic elements of sideline cheerleading, such 
as aerial maneuvers, f loor tumbling, and balancing exercises . . . . [C]ompetitive cheer is an athletic 
endeavor that ‘could be easily described as group f loor gymnastics.’” (quoting Biediger v. Quinnipiac 
Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 295 (D. Conn. 2009)); Cassman, supra note 5, at 254 (explaining that the 
high-risk stunts and routines performed in competitive cheerleading resemble gymnastics); J. Brad 
Reich, All the [Athletes] Are Equal, but Some Are More Equal than Others: An Objective Evluation of Title 
IX’s Past, Present and Recommendations for Its Future, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 525, 558 (2003) (explaining 
that cheerleading has “strenuous tumbling runs, human pyramids, back f lips, lifts, catches and tosses” 
making it “comparable to gymnastics”); Glatt, supra note 5, at 322 (“Similar to the Title IX recognized 
sport of gymnastics, competitive cheerleaders must practice for hours, following a regimen that hones 
specific skills and talents.”).
91. Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 101.
92. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 249 (“In 2004 there were an estimated 28,414 emergency room visits by 
cheerleaders.”).
93. The National Center for Catastrophic Sports Injury Research at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill conducted a study on catastrophic injuries in high school and college sports for men and 
women and found that cheerleading accounted for 65.2% of high school and 70.5% of college 
catastrophic injuries among all female sports. See Frederick O. Mueller & Robert C. Cantu, Nat’l 
Ctr. for Catastrophic Sports Injury Res., Twenty-Sixth Annual Report Fall 1982–Spring 
2008, at 26 (2008), available at http://www.unc.edu/depts/nccsi/AllSport.pdf.
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safe performance of cheerleading.94 This suggests that if an athletic component were 
included in the standard for evaluating whether an activity constitutes a genuine athletic 
opportunity, competitive cheerleading would satisfy that factor.
 Also, the substantial proportionality test should not expect a new activity to offer 
competitive opportunities comparable to existing sports. This undermines Title IX’s 
goal of creating new athletic opportunities for both male and female athletes. Title 
IX allows universities to create new teams as a way of providing genuine athletic 
opportunities in which its students profess an interest;95 however, for the new activity 
to comply with statutory requirements, it is expected to meet a level comparable to 
sports that have achieved intercollegiate association recognition after years of 
development.96
 No new athletic opportunities can survive such scrutiny.97 This is troublesome 
because some universities may not want—or may not have the resources—to commit 
to an athletic opportunity that does not yet qualify as a sport because of the 
implications for the school’s compliance with Title IX.98 A reluctance to invest in such 
activities will hinder the development of new sports, or at least hinder the speed at 
which they develop.99 For universities that do have an interest in the emerging activity, 
seeking sport or “genuine athletic opportunity” qualification will be difficult.100 
Allowing new activities that satisfy the administrative factors (i.e., activities that are 
administered and regulated by the athletic department or receive most of the same 
benefits as current varisty sports, among other things) to have a developmental “grace” 
period in which competition opportunities can grow—so that the athletes can still be 
counted for purposes of Title IX compliance—will give universities the chance to 
devote resources to the new activity and will help to expand competition to the level 
of already existing sports.
 Quinnipiac’s competitive cheerleading team competed at ten competitions in 
2009–10, but faced five different scoring systems. The court found this to be 
94. See Cheerleading as a Sport, Am. Ass’n of Cheerleading Coaches & Adm’rs, https://www.aacca.org/
content.aspx?item=Resources/Test.xml (last visited Jan. 2, 2014).
95. See Monroe, supra note 12 (stating that this approach “affords recipients [of federal funding] the 
f lexibility to create athletics programs that are responsive to the specific interests and abilities of their 
particular student bodies”).
96. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 691 F.3d 85, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2012). 
97. See Glatt, supra note 5, at 320 (“Even if a university establishes a new women’s team, the team will not 
count towards Title IX compliance unless adequate competition exists as well. Other universities may 
not yet have a similar team in place, rendering moot the first university’s attempt at advancement 
because of a lack of intercollegiate competition.”).
98. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 258 (discussing how restrictive budgets tend to cause schools to cut teams 
rather than add them).
99. See Glatt, supra note 5, at 320 (“Even if a university establishes a new women’s team, the team will not 
count towards Title IX compliance unless adequate competition exists as well. Other universities may 
not yet have a similar team in place, rendering moot the first university’s attempt at advancement 
because of a lack of intercollegiate competition.”).
100. See id.
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detrimental to its “genuine athletic opportunity” qualification.101 However, the 
NCSTA (the intercollegiate competitive cheer organization created in 2009 which 
established the early structure of competitions, scoring systems, and rules) had its 
first meeting in the same academic year that Quinnipiac planned to compete. This 
did not provide sufficient time for the organization to establish a competition 
structure, scoring system, or rules similar to that of the NCAA, which has been in 
existence since 1906.102 The NCSTA meeting was held in September 2009, and its 
eight members established a uniform set of rules to govern the activity for a season 
that was to commence immediately.103 In contrast, the NCAA was conceived in 1905 
and, by its second meeting, had sixty-two charter universities creating the structure 
and rules behind intercollegiate sports.104 For the court to expect a new organization 
with only eight members to achieve a structure like that of the NCAA in such a 
small period of time is unrealistic. 
 The substantial proportionality test, as it currently stands, fails to promote the 
growth of athletic programs and hinders the development of new sports. Title IX 
was originally created to equalize the disparity between opportunities for women 
and men in sports, with men traditionally receiving a majority of the resources. In 
addition, the statute’s goal was to add teams to university athletic departments, not 
subtract them.105 With the budgetary issues that universities are facing, including the 
costs to comply with the statute and maintain substantial proportionality, university 
athletic departments are cutting many men’s athletic teams rather than adding 
women’s teams, as was originally intended by Title IX.106 Although cutting men’s 
programs has led to several lawsuits, the courts have accepted the termination of 
programs as an acceptable way for university athletic departments to comply with 
Title IX’s requirements.107 Cutting men’s teams not only negatively impacts male 
athletes, it affects women as well because universities are not creating new 
opportunities in women’s sports.108 Universities have also resorted to adding women’s 
101. See Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 728 F. Supp. 2d 62, 97–100 (D. Conn. 2010). 
102. See National Collegiate Athletic Association, Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_
Collegiate_Athletic_Association (last updated Dec. 31, 2013).
103. See Biediger, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 82–83 (noting that the rules defined the length of the season, the 
number of contests required, the rules for competition and scoring, the number of scholarships that can 
be offered, and the number of participants allowed on each roster, among other things).
104. See National Collegiate Athletic Association, supra note 102.
105. See Title IX: Athletics and Sports, Feminist Majority Found., http://www.feminist.org/sports/titleix_
sports.asp (last visited Jan. 2, 2014). 
106. See Larson, supra note 15, at 1607, 1610. This is particularly true for schools that sponsor football 
programs because no women’s team carries a roster size equivalent to that of football, and the average 
NCAA Division I-A roster consists of 118 male athletes. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 258 (“Wrestling 
teams experienced the worst decline, losing 171 teams, a forty percent decrease. Of the schools that 
discontinued a men’s sports team during that time frame, thirty-one percent cited compliance with 
gender equity requirements as a strong inf luence behind the decision.”).
107. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 259–60.
108. See Larson, supra note 15, at 1621.
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teams in sports that do not compete at the varsity level, such as crew, because the 
cost of operation is low and the roster sizes are large, offsetting men’s football.109 
While these sports do create more genuine athletic opportunities for women, other 
sports—especially those that are more expensive to operate and in which there may 
be a stronger interest and the possibility of competing at the varsity level, like 
volleyball—will be sacrificed for the sake of compliance.110
 Modifying prong one of the substantial proportionality test to include an athletic 
component and developmental period for new activities would preserve the integrity 
of Title IX, as well as provide more athletic opportunities for both men and women. 
Additionally, when an activity satisfies the OCR factors, the OCR should allow the 
activity a developmental period to attain a competitive level on par with other varsity 
sports.111 This would encourage institutions to invest in new activities because they 
would have a greater chance of achieving Title IX compliance.112 Under a modified 
standard, a sport such as competitive cheerleading (for which there is a genuine 
interest) would increase athletic opportunities for female athletes without sacrificing 
existing opportunities for male athletes, and preserve the integrity of intercollegiate 
athletics by encouraging universities to create and maintain equal athletic 
opportunities for men and women.
109. Another example of this is rowing. See Larson, supra note 15, at 1610–11; see also Kristen Rozum, 
Comment, Staying Inbounds: Reforming Title IX in Collegiate Athletics, 18 Wis. Women’s L.J. 155, 170–
71 (2003).
110. See Larson, supra note 15, at 1610–11; Rozum, supra note 109.
111. A similar approach can be taken for emerging NCAA sports. See supra note 54.
112. See Cassman, supra note 5, at 260.
